ABSTRACT The cloud computing paradigm is changing how businesses operate, providing greater efficiency, tolerance, elasticity and flexibility in computing workloads. Underpinning these changes are multiple data centers, operated by different entities and distributed globally. Despite these benefits, cloud computing presents new classes of cyber-attack, opportunities to attack and processes to subvert. One of the primary strategies to defend against cyber-attacks is the migration process. A secure Virtual Machine (VM) migration is essential to safeguard cloud data centers against insider and outsider attacks. In this paper, we propose a collaborative anomaly detection system for discovering insider and outsider attacks from cloud systems and their migration process. The proposed system is named Mixture Localization-based Outliers (MLO) and utilizes Gaussian-mixture models for fitting network data and a local outlier factor function for discovering abnormal patterns in network traffic data. In order to validate the effectiveness of the models, the datasets of UNSW-NB15 and BoT-IoT are employed. The experimental results have revealed the high performance of the proposed system compared with several peer anomaly detection techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cloud computing revolution has provided increased availability, flexibility, cost-effectiveness and functionality to developers, businesses and individuals the world over. These advantages stem from the cloud development of 'pay as you go'form, whereby users only pay for the resources they consume [1] . One additional advantage for the use of cloud computing is the ability to migrate virtual machines (VMs), either through replication or migration, between geographic vendors and vendors in response to changes in user base or for economic reasons. The movement of devices, either through replication of resources or migration between competitor data centers, presents a cyber-security risk for a sufficiently advanced threat actor to potentially exploit [2] .
The 2019 Verizon data breach report stated that there had been more than 41,000 cyber incidents and over 2,000 data breaches from 86 countries targeted cloud services [3] . Moreover, The Microsoft cyber threat report stated that the number The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Chunsheng Zhu. of cyber incidents targeted cloud infrastructures have considerably increased [4] . Outsider attacks are still dominant as they were estimated by 69% of incidents, with insider threats being the remaining 31%. The most frequent cloud threats include storage misconfigurations, stolen credits, ransomware and crypto-mining attacks [3] . Cloud storage misconfigurations expose approximately 60 million records in cloud data centers. Stolen credentials have been used by roundly 60% of outsider attacks. Ransomware attacks are still increasing and are estimated by about 21% of cyber-security incidents. Attackers utilize crypto-mining attacks in approximately 2.5% of all cyber-security incidents [3] .
There are several security threats in virtualization technology that are yet to be addressed [2] , [5] . Virtualized systems have a higher likelihood of compromise for multiple reasons; additional layers of complexity, attacks on host infrastructure, lack of transparency across third party infrastructure, misconfigured systems and outdated systems. The VM may be the target itself, and its sensitive data might be compromised. A sufficiently advanced attacker could exploit private keys or credentials that can be used to further access to other linked systems [5] . There are examples of this occurring; in February 2018, Tesla's Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud system was illegally accessed and the system used it for mining cryptocurrency [6] . Individual systems and services provided by Microsoft Azure were compromised. In May 2017, a data breach attack on River city Media resulted in the exposure of 1.4 billion email accounts on cloud servers [7] . In July 2017, the Equifax credit reporting agency in the U.S. discovered and blocked malicious network events linked with a consumer web portal within their network stack [7] .
In cloud systems, hosted hypervisors, such as VMware, Xen and Hyper-V, offer VM migration (i.e., live migration) in real-time. Live migration is defined as the process of migrating VM's memory contents from one physical host to another host target while maintaining services [8] . The live migration should be executed in real-time, with respect to the pre-negotiated level of service rules that govern the service availability termed by the Service Level Agreement (SLA). The protection of VM migration is still an unsolved and complex issue, dependent on several factors, vendors and technology stacks [5] - [7] . Protecting VM migration against attacks from either insider or outsider threats is still challenging [9] - [11] . The live migration of VMs is insecure when the migration protocol is not encrypted, or it travels over an unprotected channel [10] .
Defence-in-depth is a standard cyber-security paradigm and is necessary for cloud-based systems as much as in traditional deployments. Firewall systems can be deployed at the boundary nodes of virtual networks, but they are limited in detecting insider attacks [4] . Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) are well established, but they demand many configurations to be deployed into cloud environments [12] . The decreased visibility of cloud networking limits the ability of a NIDS deployment to detect attacks across networks beyond the scope of that machine. The development of distributed and collaborative NIDS should address the challenge of implementing many NIDSs at every VM [13] , [14] . The collaborative NIDS should be deployed at the cloud end nodes and physical servers; and alerts are correlated for reducing computational resources [4] , as we propose in this paper.
This study proposes a new collaborative NIDS systembased anomaly detection for detecting insider and outsider attacks from cloud systems and their live migration process. The proposed system is named Mixture Localization-based Outliers (MLO), which is developed by Gaussian-mixture models [13] for fitting statistical flow features of network data and a local outlier factor function [15] for detecting attack vectors. The system is trained and validated using the UNSW-NB15 [16] and BoT-IoT [17] datasets.
The main contributions of this study are as follows:
• We propose a new collaborative anomaly detection system for discovering insider and outsider attacks from cloud centers and their live migration process.
• We suggest using a Gaussian mixture model for fitting normal variations and detecting abnormal instances using an adaptable baseline of local outlier factor.
• We evaluate the proposed system using different datasets and compare its performance with several anomaly detection methods to determine its effectiveness while deploying it at cloud data servers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The background and existing literature review related to the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in the cloud is discussed in Section II. Section III explains the proposed anomaly detection system of Mixture Localization-based Outliers (MLO). Section IV discusses the development of the proposed system in the cloud systems. Section V describes the experimental results and discussions. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This section outlines the threats and countermeasures in cloud systems, particularly in relation to IDS systems. Moreover, this work identifies the role of IDS in cloud systems.
A. LIVE MIGRATION IN CLOUD
Cloud computing is defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as ''a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction'' [10] , [18] . The live migration in cloud systems is defined as the procedures of migrating VMs memory contents from one host to another while keeping online services. The live migration should achieve the goal of minimizing the total migration downtime, following the pre-negotiated level of service rules that control the service availability of the SLA [8] .
There are two main methods to achieving VM memory migration; pre-copy and post-copy, as depicted in Figure 1 [19] . The pre-copy migration method consists of two phases; the push phase and stop-and-copy phase. In the push phase, all memory pages are migrated to the target host while the VM is still running. If there are any changes to memory pages during the copy process, they need to be re-copied to maintain consistency in the two VM instances. In the stopand-copy phase, the VM is stopped on the source host, and remaining memory pages are copied, and then target host VM is started. The source host is first suspended, the VMs minimal execution state is copied to the target host and then resume the VM on the target host. If the migration process is unsuccessful, the process will be repeated. By contrast, the post-copy migration process has a higher period of downtime, but it is considered less complicated. The post-copy process suspends the VM at the source before initiating the copy of memory to the destination. Only on completion is service resumed.
A common reason for VM migration between hosts within a data center is in response to resource 'hotspots', dynamic fluctuations in the responsiveness of hosts caused by sudden needs in other VMs in the shared environment [20] . Hotspots occur quickly, and host migration needs to occur faster than can be manually detected and initiated. To overcome sudden changes in workloads, and avoid errors in the redistribution of the system load, automated processes are necessary. Automated procedures would allow for the detection of hotspots and allow for the maintenance of service level agreements and VM responsiveness.
B. NETWORK SECURITY ISSUES IN CLOUD
Security is a significant consideration in the enterprise selection of cloud providers and considered an impediment in the increased use of cloud systems [21] . The cloud vulnerability model presented by Gruschka and Jensen [22] used three different classes of participants; user, service and cloud, as shown in Figure 2 . Using the concept of attack surfaces, the authors classified attacks into six categories: Service-to-User, User-to-Service, Cloud-to-Service, Serviceto-Cloud, Cloud-to-User and User-to-Cloud, as demonstrated in Table 1 . Virtualization is one of the core technologies of cloud computing, enabling shared systems large amounts of flexibility whilst retaining efficiency on host systems. While consumers have control over individual guest VMs, including their storage, processes and some network communications, the provider controls the entire underlying cloud environment [5] . Such environments create new vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by diverse scenarios of hacking. Frequent attacks on virtualization that are related to fundamental cloud characteristics include VM migration attacks, signature wrapping attacks, VM escape, VM hopping, insecure interfaces and APIs, and data loss and leakage [23] - [25] .
VM migration attacks are specifically attacks on the VM migration process. If the process itself is insecure or able to be co-opted, the VM contents may be compromised. Techniques such as ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning and route hijacking are potential vectors for this class of attack [23] . Signature wrapping attacks are a class of attack that occurs when a malicious user modifies the content of a signed message without invalidating the signature. An attacker essentially makes use of the fact that signature elements do not convey any information to their references are in the document [24] . VM escape attacks are designed to take advantage of the interface between guest VMs and VOLUME 7, 2019 the underlying host system. The exploitation of vulnerable drivers on the guest can lead to a measure of access on the host system, allowing an attacker access to other VMs running in the same environment.
VM hopping is a similar attack class but relies on weak separation in the host operating system to allow an attacker access to resources on other VMs running on the same physical host. Insecure interfaces and APIs are also not unique to the cloud, and virtualized environments but are common to the user interface, and API layers. Large portions of interaction with cloud systems occur via APIs based on protocols such as HTTP/REST, JSON/XML, SOAP and WSDL. The security of the hosted services depends entirely on the security of these APIs. Weak implementation of these exposes organizations to various security threats [22] , [25] .
There are also many malicious intents, such as data poisoning and false data injection attacks, to compromise cloud centers. The threat of data compromise is higher in cloud-based systems, as the infrastructure is unknown to the user and centrally managed. Security tests are often contrary to the acceptable use policy, and traditional security defense in depth processes are unavailable. There is a level of trust with the cloud provider and their security processes that cannot be verified [21] , [25] .
C. INTRUSION DETECTION IN CLOUD
The primary aim of the IDS is to provide a protective layer against malicious activities that attempt to compromise cloud systems. IDS can be either a hardware device or a software application that monitors and analyzes network systems from potential threat and policy violations [4] , [10] . Current cyber threats in the cloud are becoming highly sophisticated, and detecting such threats are both costly and time-consuming. Designing an effective IDS is essential for detecting insider and outsider attacks for securing cloud operations [11] .
IDS detection methods can be classified into three categories based on their triggering mechanism; misuse-, anomaly-and a hybrid-based that merges the first two classes [14] , [16] , [26] . A Misuse-based Detection System (MDS) monitors network traffic searching for matches between observed behaviors or patterns and known attacks, based on a signature database. Although this type of detection has a lower occurrence of false-positive rates and higher detection rates to known attacks, there is a significant drawback in the ability to detect new attack types. By contrast, an Anomaly-based Detection System (ADS) uses network traffic profiles created to identify anomalous behavior based on the predefined threshold. Unlike MDS, ADS can identify existing and zero-day attacks. However, this method still produces high false-positive rates and demand large amounts of normal events to design its profile [27] .
IDSs can identify suspicious activity either in a real or non-real time detection [4] . In real-time detection, attacks are detected while the hosts/VMs or network systems are being monitored for anomalous activities and can immediately flag any deviations as an attack. Conversely, a non-real-time detection handles audit data with delay. Audit data can be collected and aggregated, whether in a centralized manner from a single, or in a distributed manner from multiple locations or sources [13] . A VM monitor solution inserts as a software layer to control the physical resources, and it allows running many operating systems. It can improve the efficiency of detecting and preventing attacks in IDS as they have complete control of the system resources and excellent visibility of the internal state of the virtual machines [10] .
D. PREVIOUS STUDIES
Several research studies have been carried out to design IDSs specifically for use in cloud systems. For example, Tan et al. [14] suggested a distributed IDS of host and network systems. The system includes two nodes, a cooperative agent and a central coordinator, for detecting cyber-attacks. Similar to the distributed IDS, Moustafa et al. [13] proposed a collaborative intrusion detection framework for discovering cyber-attacks from cloud systems. More recently, Patil et al. [10] developed a hypervisor-level distributed IDS framework for discovering insider and outsider attacks from cloud systems. However, the proposed methods still produce high false alarm rates and cannot accurately define the baseline of a normal profile.
Zonouz [28] attempted to detect cyber threats by employing a game-theoretic response strategy against adversaries modeled as opponents in a two-player Stackelberg stochastic game. Their proposed approach enables an automated response in the face of fast-spreading intrusions. In [29] , the authors developed a DoS attack detection system, which extracts the geometrical correlations between network features, characterizes multivariate correlation analysis, and applies the anomaly-based detection principle. Their method learns the patterns of legitimate network traffic only and also applies a triangular area-based technique to enhance and speed up the detection performance.
Tesfahun and Bhaskari [30] proposed an IDS relying on a synthetic minority over-sampling technique with an information gain feature reduction for constructing a reduced feature dataset. This technique then utilized a random forest technique for attack classification. In [9] , the authors studied the issue of remotely checking the integrity of regenerating coded data against corruption under a real-world cloud storage environment, designing and implementing a practical data integrity protection scheme for a specific regenerating code while preserving its intrinsic properties of fault tolerance and repair saving. Also in [31] , a scalable decentralized large scale intrusion detection framework was developed, where it provides a service for defending against attacks by sharing potential evidence of intrusions between participant IDSs via a distributed hash table architecture.
Wood et al. [32] employed virtual machine migration for fast elimination of hotspots in data center environments. The developed approach followed a two-fold operation, applying black-and gray-box strategies. The former approach assists in eliminating simultaneous hotspots arising from different resources, whilst more accurate resource requirement inference was achieved through the gray-box information. Results showed that server hotspots are reduced within 20 seconds, and better migration decisions were accomplished. Another work approaches a similar problem by designing an architecture for monitoring and detecting SLA violations in cloud computing infrastructure [33] .
In [34] , a secure scheme was developed to allow live migration of virtual machines performed over geographic distances. This work heavily utilized Wide Area Networks (WANs). The authors integrated deterministic light path network services (i.e., circuits with 1Gbps capacity) with the design proposed in [19] for better dynamic networkbandwidth adaptation. Results showed that in less than 2 seconds of application downtime, the test live virtual machine had been migrated between Amsterdam (Netherlands) and San Diego (USA). When compared with a Local Area Network (LAN), the downtime was 10× higher. Danev et al. [35] also considered the problem of VM migration and proposed three phases of secure migration algorithm based on a platform hardware module called vTPM. However, the major limitation of this approach is that it does not support live migration of VMs, and only supported the post-copy migration protocol.
III. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED ANOMALY DETECTION
The paradigm of deploying a collaborative IDS for each node in a cloud system has significant advantages in improving cloud security, as it enables the detection of both insider and outsider attacks. The proposed system named Mixture Localization-based Outliers (MLO), which uses Gaussian Mixture models [13] for fitting variations of legitimate observations and detecting insider and outsider attacks using an adaptable local factor function [15] .
The proposed system aims to develop an adaptive anomaly detection installed at each node in cloud data centers, which identifies malicious activities with a central data capture and logging module. The technical functions of the proposed system involve three stages; capturing and logging, data preprocessing, and a decision engine for identifying suspicious activities in cloud environments. This system is depicted in Figure 3 . Each of these stages is discussed below.
A. CAPTURING AND LOGGING STAGE
The capturing and logging stage includes the steps of capturing network data and storing them to be processed by the proposed MLO anomaly detection system, like the steps of establishing the UNSW-NB15 [16] and BoT-IoT dataset [17] . For training and validating the proposed system, it needs data sources collected from a network of cloud servers. Network capture tools such as tcpdump and snort could be used to collect large volumes of network packets (i.e., pcap files). Network flow features are then extracted from the pcap files using packet processing tools such as Bro or Argus [13] . There is a large number of features extracted from packets. The data features are then recorded in a database management system such as MySQL to filter them and evaluate the proposed system. VOLUME 7, 2019
B. PRE-PROCESSING STAGE
The pre-processing stage inspects and filters network data in three steps. Firstly, the feature conversion step replaces non-numeric features with numeric ones. This is as the proposed MLO anomaly detection system depends on statistical models that only work with numeric features. For example, the feature conversion step maps the protocol data TCP, HTTP and ICMP into 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Secondly, the feature reduction step uses the PCA technique [4] to adopt essential features that improve the processing time and detection accuracy of the proposed MLO system. Lastly, the feature normalization step arranges the value of each feature in a particular range to remove any bias from raw data. We apply the z-score function (Z), as it can scale the network data with no change in the statistical properties of the original network data. It scales each feature (X ) with a 0 mean (µ) and 1 standard deviation (δ), to normalize the data using equation (1) .
C. PROPOSED ANOMALY DETECTION USING MIXTURE LOCALIZATION OUTLIERS MODELS
In this section, the proposed anomaly detection system using new Mixture Localization based Outliers Models (MLO), is discussed. The MLO system is designed based on the Gaussian mixture models (GMM) [13] for fitting variations of normal data and a Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [15] for detecting insider and outsider attacks from cloud systems. The GMM gives the advantages of having a more flexible cluster covariance and accommodation of mixed memberships of points to clusters at different degrees, while simultaneously being able to identify outliers in a cluster that is considered as an inlier in another data cluster via the LOF function.
1) FINITE GAUSSIAN MIXTURE MODEL
A finite mixture model is described as a convex combination of different Probability Density Functions (PDFs). The joint characteristics of the functions can estimate any random distribution. It is a resilient probabilistic mechanism for multivariate data [13] . 
such that x is feature µµ values, µµ is a mean of the distribution and δ 2 is variance.;; he PDF of a mixture model is declared by a convex combination of K -component PDFs and is computed by
where (α 1 , . . . , α k ) denote the mixing proportions, every θ k is a set of parameters defining the k components which depend on the number of the adopted features and θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ k , α 1 , . . . , α k ) is the parameters required to build the mixture model. Applying the probability conditions, α k must achieve the following constraints:
The mixture model is estimated by the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) [37] . Supposing that X data with N records, the probability of data in which x i estimated by
The MLE is estimated from the parameters (θ ) by
The GMM is the mixture model that can fit statistical variations of network data. It computes the PDFs of normal data in the training and testing phases of the proposed system from equations (2) to (6) . The parameters θ = (α, µ, δ) of the GMM are estimated using the EM algorithm to model network data in the training and testing phases.
2) LOCAL OUTLIER FACTOR
A Local Outlier Factor (LOF) function can be employed as a threshold for detecting and abnormal records that deviate from the normal profile of the training phase designed by the GMM. The LOF function operates by measuring the local variation for a given data point P as compared to its k-nearest neighbors [15] . Based on the concept of local density, if P has a density record that does not exist in the densities of the normal profile, the density can be considered an outlier/anomaly record. The LOF was chosen to be integrated with our models through several parameters, which include kdistance, reachability distance and local reachability density, and the search for the nearest neighbors was implemented using a nearest neighbor search algorithm [36] . A LOF function can be applied to the PFD values estimated by the GMM for every record. Let assume each PDF value is p point, where p denotes the distance between point p and its k th nearest neighbor. The mathematical foundation of LOF is formulated in equations 7, 8 and 9, respectively [37] .
Local reachability density, lrd k (p), is defined as:
LOF value, LOF k (p), is defined as:
where N k (A) is the set of k nearest neighbors and |N k (A)| is the size of the set, which is equal to k = 2 in our model. The
Euclidean distance between p and q is represented as d k (p, q), and the reachability distance (rd k (p, q)) between p and q. The GMM and LOF are estimated to the normal profile and testing set, as discussed below to design the proposed MLO system.
3) TRAINING PHASE
It is essential to train the proposed system using normal records without attack ones in the training phase to ensure correct detection. Given a set of normal records (r normal 1:n ) in which every record includes many data features, where r normal 1:n = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x D } normal , the normal profile contains only statistical characteristics from r normal 1:n . The GMM includes the computed parameters θ = (α, µ, δ) to estimate the PDFs using the parameters of Dir (X|π, α, Z) for each record in the training phase.
Algorithm 1 illustrates the steps for building the normal profile (pro), with the parameters (α, µ, δ) of the GMM estimated for all the legitimate records (r normal 1:n ), and then the PDFs of the features (x 1:D ) are calculated using equations (2) to (6) . Following this, the LOF is calculated by subtracting the first quartile subtracted from the third quartile of the PDFs to generate a threshold that can define abnormal records in the testing phase. It is obvious that quartiles divide data into sequential intervals with equal probabilities [27] .
Algorithm 1 The Creation of the Normal Profile in the Training Phase
Input: normal record (r normal 1:n ) Output: normal profile (pro) 1. for each record i in (r normal 1:n ) do 2. estimate the parameters (θ = (α, µ, δ)) of the GMM 3. estimate the PDFs using equations (2) to (6) based on the parameters computed in Step 2 4. estimate LOF based on Step 3 5. end for 6. compute lower = quartile (LOF, 1) 7. calculate upper = quartile (LOF, 3) 8. pro ← {(θ = (α, µ, δ)), (lower, upper of LOF)} 9. return pro
4) TESTING PHASE
In the testing phase, the GMM PDF (PDF testing ) of every record (r testing ) is calculated using the same parameters computed from the normal profile (pro). Algorithm 2 illustrates the steps in the testing phase for specifying the Gaussian PDFs of attack records.
Step 1 estimates the PDF of every record using the stored normal parameters (θ = (α, µ, δ)),
Step 2 computes the LOF value for each record using the PDF estimated in Step 1. From steps 3 to 7, the threshold that can classify normal and attack records is described. The detection baseline relies on considering any LOF testing that falls outside of this interval as outliers/attacks, else they are treated as normal records.
Algorithm 2 Testing Phase and Classifying Normal and Attack Records
Input: testing record (r testing ), normal profile (pro) {(θ = (α, µ, δ)), (lower, upper of LOF)} Output: normal or attack record 1. estimate the PDF testing using equations 2 to 6 with parameters (θ = (α, µ, δ)) 2. Estimate LOF for records based on the output of
Step 1 3. if (LOF testing <= (lower of LOF))) || (PDF testing >= (upper of LOF) then 4.
return outlier/attack 5. else 6.
return normal 7. end if
IV. DEPLOYMENT OF PROPOSED MLO SYSTEM
The proposed MLO anomaly detection system is designed to be deployed at cloud servers to monitor insider and outsider attacks at the network nodes or virtual machines of cloud systems. The proposed MLO system is capable of effectively analyzing network anomaly behaviors. This can be particularly helpful in detecting security threat vectors in instances where signature-based systems cannot, such as in new zero-day attacks, or when threat traffic is encrypted. This is because it learns using statistical flow features from packet headers and it does not inspect the encrypted payload of packets. A possible solution to with encrypted data is utilizing cryptoanalysis tools that allow the proposed system to generate alerts from packet headers and payloads. The MLO system is robust under noisy conditions of normal variations to define attack vectors using statistical flow features only.
We propose a proof of concept that describes how the MLO system could be deployed within a cloud environment to provide a layered approach of defense. The proposed system could be integrated with a Virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM) for providing more secure data transmission between different data centers. This system would be deployed for monitoring hosts/virtual machines, network nodes and with vTPM, as briefly discussed in the following:
• A Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS): it runs on each virtual machine to monitor inbound and outbound packets. If it detects malicious traffic, then it may block the source IP access to the network to prevent an attacker from VM hopping and gaining access to another VM.
• A Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS): it is placed at the infrastructure layer within IaaS to monitor traffic to and from all connected systems within the same physical host.
• Virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM): it allows for cryptographic integrity in a platform-agnostic manner, and is integrated into existing Operating Systems. Modern implementations operate on virtualized systems and VOLUME 7, 2019 have been integrated into cloud offerings [40] . However, further evaluation of the performance of vTPM implementations is required. Trusted vTPM protection is used to secure data migration across different data centers. However, we need to test and analyze performance.
The design of the system is based on a set of assumptions; the Xen hypervisors used in our testbed will be located in the same domain, have the same IP address space and share common storage. In addition to the observed facts and characteristics of the cloud deployment model, we could utilize an anomaly detection approach based on the MLO to obtain the extracted behavioral characteristics in the architecture. Usually, the behavior of the application is kept constant and utilizes equal amounts of resources in the process of a VM live migration. The performance of the VM profile is affected by consistent impacts of live migration and environmental changes. A wise approach would be to investigate the behaviors of VM according to the similarity of its performance profile [37] .
The proposed system could also be designed as a distributed multipath solution to route data securely across multiple paths between different data centers, so it would require more time and resources to detect insider and outsider attacks effectively. Once the GMM and LOF models are implemented, it is possible to simulate the system in real-time to measure its performance. Our design would achieve better detection rate with a lower false alarm rate than state of the art implementations, keeping into account the SLA requirements are satisfied.
A. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION METRICS OF SATISFYING SLA REQUIREMENTS
The performance evaluation metrics that would be considered to analyze the negotiated SLA between cloud providers and satisfy the Quality of Service (QoS) requirements during the VM live migration process are downtime period, total migration time and network overhead. These are described as follows. Downtime Period refers to the period in which services are running on a virtual machine become unavailable to external guests. Current cloud providers such as Amazon, Microsoft and Google offer SLAs with 99.95% availability [38] . An IP monitoring tool is written to automatically send an echo-request packet or ping the VM during the migration process, controlling the interval between each ping in milliseconds, so the most accurate downtime reading is recorded.
We could record the sequence number and timestamp of each ping request, and this gives the downtime value. Total Migration Time refers to the total time taken to transfer one running VM contents from one source host to another target host across different data centers. For our testbed scenario, we run and initiate the VM migration command line using secure socket shell (SSH) and note down the time before and after the migration command is completed. For example, the migration command is typed as Network overhead refers to the measurement of any difference in VM response time at any given request with and without SLA verification. This may also include any combination of extra indirect computation time, bandwidth and memory [23] . We can measure the amount of network overhead by simulating traffic at time t 0 , t 1 , t 2 . . . t n , where n denotes the response time phase crossing the IPSEC/VPN tunnel gateway using a packet analyzer such as Wireshark tool. Then we measure the mean response time at each time interval for both normal and malicious traffic.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND EVALUATION

A. DATASETS AND PRE-PROCESSING MODULE USED FOR EVALUATION
The evaluation of the proposed MLO anomaly detection system has been conducted using the datasets of UNSW-NB15 [16] and BoT-IoT [17] . These datasets contain both normal and attack vectors. The UNSW-NB15 dataset includes 2,540,044 network records, logged in four CSV files. Every record involves 47 features and is labeled whether the record is normal or abnormal. The BoT-IoT dataset includes more than 72 million network records. The extracted flow features were stored at CSV files. The dataset involves DoS, DDoS, OS and Service Scan, Keylogging and Data exfiltration attacks. The MLO system is evaluated using the selected best 10 features from the UNSW-NB15 and BoT-IoT datasets using the PCA, as presented in Tables 2 and 3 , respectively.
The proposed models were developed using the 'R language' on an Intel Core i7 CPU processor with 16 GB of RAM running Ubuntu version 16.04. The experiments were conducted on both the UNSW-NB15 and BoT-IoT datasets, by selecting random samples from CSV files with several sample sizes between 70,000 and 150,000. Each random sample had normal records between 60-70% of the total size, and some were used to establish both the normal profile and testing set.
B. EVALUATION CRITERIA
The accuracy (AC), Detection Rate (DR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) are clarified below to evaluate proposed MLO system.
• The Accuracy (AC) is the ratio of all normal and attack records that are accurately classified:
• The Detection Rate (DR) is the ratio of correctly detected attack records:
• False Positive Rate (FPR) is the ratio of the number of incorrectly detected attack records:
where TP (true positive) represents the number of actual attacks identified as attacks, TN (true negative) represents number of actual normal instances identified as normal, FN (false negative) represents the number of actual attacks identified as normal, and FP (false positive) represents the number of actual normal instances classified as attacks.
C. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The MLO system based on GMM and LOF models was trained and validated on the UNSW_NB15 and BoT_IoT datasets. The density estimation of the GMM can demonstrate that there are differences between normal values in the training phase and attack values in the testing phase. For example, random samples (N=150) were selected from both datasets to reveal the density differences between the normal and attack samples, as shown in Figure 5 . These differences can assist in differentiating between normal and suspicious records effectively. The GMM model was trained and validated using a large amount of legitimate data in the training phase. This is to ensure the adapted parameters are reliable enough to act as VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 5. Samples from both datasets after applying MLO technique. a baseline for the training phase. The performance evaluation of the MLO anomaly detection system was conducted on the features selected from the UNSW-NB15, and BoTIoT datasets, with the overall DR, accuracy and FPR values demonstrated in Table 4 . Figures 6 and 7 present the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves which display the relationship between the DRs and FPRs. The results revealed that with increasing the sample size from 150,000 to 300,000, the DR of the model increases from 96.17% to 98.81% and from 95.23% to 97.98% using the UNSW-NB15 and BoT_IoT datasets, respectively.
The performance evaluation results of the MLO system is compared with three existing anomaly detection mechanisms, namely the Triangle Area Nearest Neighbors (TANN) [27] , Euclidean Distance Map (EDM) [39] and Multivariate Correlation Analysis (MCA) [29] , Outlier Dirichlet Mixture (ODM) [4] with their overall DRs and FARs presented in Figures 6 and 7 using the UNSW_NB15 and BoT-IoT datasets, respectively.
The proposed MLO system also can perfectly detect different attack types in both datasets, as shown in Figure 8 and 9. The proposed MLO system can accurately detect different attack types in a range of 95%-99.5% using the UNSW-NB15 dataset. Similarly, it can identify different attack types of the BoT-IoT dataset in an average of 94.8%-98.3% DRs. The system can detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks with about 99.5% and 98.1% DRs using the UNSW_NB15 and BoT-IoT datasets, respectively. It can also identify Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks by 98.6% using the BoT-IoT dataset. The proposed MLO system can also detect the remaining malicious activities related attacks, such as reconnaissance, port scanning, keylogging, and data theft, with reasonable detection rates in both datasets that attempt to disrupt cloud services.
The proposed MLO system performs better than the other techniques because of its potential design using the GMM and LOF models. The proposed system can detect different attack types in both data by increasing the sample size of normal data to estimate the parameters of both models accurately. The GMM can perfectly fit the boundaries of each feature as it accurately estimates the mixing weights of network features in order to model normal data. Moreover, the LOF function can successfully specify the boundaries between normal and outlier observations.
The proposed system could be easily deployed by cloud computing centers. This could happen when the network data is called a distributed database management system to collect important features from different network nodes. The proposed MLO detection system could be deployed as a service as it has a low computational overhead. This advantage stems from the fact that its potential design is based on estimating statistical parameters of the GMM and LOF in real-time.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a new collaborative anomaly detection system that can identify insider and outsider attacks from cloud data centers. The proposed system is called Mixture Localization-based Outliers (MLO), and it uses Gaussian-mixture models for fitting and adapting network data and a local outlier factor function as a threshold that distinguishes attack records from normal ones. The manner of deploying the MLO system is also discussed to demonstrate how the system could monitor virtual machines, network systems of cloud data centers during the migration process. The performance of the proposed system is evaluated using the datasets of UNSW-NB15 and BoT-IoT, and compared with other anomaly detection mechanisms. The results revealed that the newly proposed MLO system accomplishes higher performances in terms of detection rate and false alarm rates that the other techniques. In future, we will extend the work by deploying the MLO system in real-cloud systems and determine SLA evaluation metrics.
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